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Abstract: In the international literature of information asymmetry research on the field of 
marketing has been published since the 1970s. Several authors revealed the signal 
function of the quantity and specificity of the information in the marketing communication 
activities mainly in case of experience goods, i.e. sellers of better quality products and 
services communicate a higher quantity of and more specific pieces of information 
voluntarily because this causes less risk for them than for their weaker competitors. If this 
practice is well-known by the customers and for this reason they trust in the products and 
services about which they possess more and/or more accurate pieces of information, then 
this business behaviour pays off for the firm with higher quality products in the higher 
prices and repurchases and becomes permanent. On the other hand, for the firms with 
lower quality products the behaviour of publishing no, less or less specific pieces of 
information becomes the norm. This paper examines this phenomenon in the market of 
higher education institutions. Our research questions therefore are the following: How 
does the quantity and quality of the information published by the higher education 
institutions affect customers’ evaluation on them? Is there any difference in this effect 
according to how much the published information is connected to the usual educational 
quality measures? To answer these questions we used quantitative classroom experiment 
method with 101 higher education students. The results of this experiment confirmed our 
hypotheses that the better universities and colleges gain competitive advantage by 
publishing more and highly specific information about themselves. Especially the 
information that is related strongly to the academic quality measures is important. In 
contrast, more informative behaviour contributes to the competitive disadvantage for the 
lower quality institutions. Our findings aim to contribute to the better understanding of the 
informational behaviour of higher education institutions. These results can also be useful 
for those responsible for the marketing communication of such organisations and for those 
who base their decisions on this communication.  
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The current study examines the role of signaling in the field of higher education marketing. 
Actuality of this topic stems from the sharpening global competition among the higher 
education institutions for students that increases the importance of advertisements, public 
relations (PR) and other marketing communications tools. Literature of the information 
asymmetry has revealed the relationship between the quality of products and services 
and the marketing communication strategies already in the 1970s.  
Our research intends to verify the validity of these general theories specifically for the 
higher education services via experimental method. Due to the limits of this paper we 
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focus only on a narrow area of this broad topic: the effect of the information published in 
higher education advertisements on the presumed quality by the customers. With its 
findings, this paper aims to contribute to the better understanding of the informational 
behaviour of higher education institutions. These results can also be useful for those 
responsible for the marketing communication of such organisations and for those who 
base their decisions on this communication, such as prospective students. 
Our research questions were the following:  
Q1. What is the effect of the specificity of the information published by the higher 
education institutions on their evaluation by the customers (current and prospective 
students)?  
Q2. Is there a difference in this effect according to how strongly the information is 
connected to the measures of academic quality? 
Our hypotheses, based on these research questions, were the following: 
H1: Publishing more specific information about themselves provides a competitive 
advantage for those higher education institutions that are characterised by higher 
academic quality.  
H2: For the lower quality higher education institutions, however, publishing more specific 
information about themselves leads to a competitive disadvantage. 
H3: The importance of the published information for the customers also matters: if the 
information is more important to them, it strengthens the previous effects for both the 
higher and the lower quality institutions (i.e. the customers are able to judge the 
institutions more precisely), and if it is less important, it weakens those effects. 
After reviewing the relevant literature in the next chapter of this paper, chapter 3 describes 
the collected data and the methodology of the empirics. In chapter 4 we present our 
findings and answer the research questions. In the last chapter we summarise the results 
with its limits and some future research directions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
The relationship between information asymmetry and marketing are took a significant 
part in the economics discussion from the mid-1970s. In his publication that is sometimes 
referred to as the first one in this field Nelson (1974) established a theoretical model to 
analyse the informational role of advertisements in the case of both search goods, where 
information on product quality is free or cheap for the prospective buyer before purchase, 
and experience goods, where pre-purchase quality information is unavailable or costly. 
For experience goods advertising is not able to provide specific and reliable information, 
or if it is, only with serious constraints. However it can communicate the quality of the 
brand. Those brands that turns out to be good during consumption will then be 
repurchased even if advertising costs are increasing the price of the product. For worse 
brands the first purchase is not followed by a repurchase. Consequently, sellers of better 
brands can, whilst sellers of worse brands cannot afford the advertisement costs. 
Advertisement under these circumstances serves as a signal (Spence, 1973). 
Based on Nelson’s model the signaling function of advertising costs was also analysed 
by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). They put their focus of inspection on the dissipative 
advertising that not urges directly on buying. They found that if goods are purchased 
repetitively, even high introductory price and strictly monotonously increasing dissipative 
marketing expenditures can act as signals. Later Hertzendorf (1993) refined the previous 
results. He found that advertising bore informational role only when prices and quality 
were not correlated. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) also examined the role of the 
signaling hypothesis behind the dissipative advertising but this time for oligopolies. They 
found support for the hypothesis and in addition they drew the conclusion that quantity of 
advertisement was depending not only on brand quality but also on the quality difference 
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compared to the competitors.      
In public relations, a sub-area of marketing, Teoh and Hwang (1991) introduced the 
signaling hypothesis as a reason behind firms’ information disclosure or information 
nondisclosure behaviour. They concluded that stronger companies sometimes 
implemented signaling strategy via adverse disclosure (releasing bad news and 
withholding good news). This strategy is harmful for the company on the short run, thus 
weaker companies cannot follow it, because they would not survive the negative 
consequences on the short run, thus the stronger ones can signal their strength through 
they can cope with the same negative effects easier. The weakest companies will deliver 
no information at all to the market. They will communicate neither the bad news because 
of the market sanctions, nor the good ones because of the costs that will not be paid back 
hence their products will not be repurchased. Or simply they do have no good news.  
In the market of IT products Afzal, Roland and Al-Squri (2008) conducted an experimental 
research to examine the effect of information asymmetry on the product evaluation in 
case of laptop computers (that are somewhere between search and experimental goods 
for those customers who are not IT experts). They found that the availability of information 
impacted the product judgements as it has probably reduced the uncertainty and may 
have provided more relevant cues to subjects.  
Higher education provides experience goods (see among others Melton and Trevino, 
2001, Dill and Soo, 2004, Hodge, 2006). Brand is the name of the university or college 
and the products are their programmes. Based on the literature review we drew the 
conclusion that higher education institutions with high academic quality will be 
significantly more transparent, while lower quality ones will provide much less or no 
information about themselves.  
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The classroom experiment were conducted between 7th and 10th April, 2014 at Faculty of 
Economics and Business Administration, University of Debrecen (UD FEBA), Hungary. 
Our sample consisted of students from three educational levels (higher vocational 
education, bachelor, and master) and 5 majors (Business Administration and 
Management at ISCED level 5 (BAM), International Business at ISCED level 5 (IB), BA in 
Business Administration and Management (BA in BAM), BA in International Economy and 
Business (BA in IEB), and MSc in Management and Leadership (MSc in ML) totalling 101 
observation units (students) distributed as indicated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Sample distribution 
 Sex Total Educational level Major female male 
Higher vocational education 
BAM 5 1 6 
IB 1 3 4 
Total 6 4 10 
Bachelor 
BA in BAM 19 12 31 
BA in IEB 27 14 41 
Total 46 26 72 
Master MSc in ML 12 7 19 
Total 64 37 101 
 
In the experiment students were asked to review 12 fake advertisements of U.S. higher 
education institutions and categorise them as top or average quality institutions and rank 
them in order of academic quality as well. The fake advertisements were composed by 
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the authors but contained only real data available on a free access online ranking site 
(http://colleges.findthebest.com) totalling 1,028 U.S. located universities and university 
colleges (all of them provided master programmes). 6 of the 12 institutions are on the top 
of the above mentioned U.S. ranking (Harvard University #1, Yale University #2, 
Princeton University #3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology #4, Columbia University 
in the City of New York #5, Stanford University #6). The remaining 6 institutions are 
significantly lower ranked, however, not at the bottom of the ranking as the institutions at 
the end of the ranking do provide no or not all of the information the experiment needed 
(the lack of information at the bottom of the ranking list reflects the message of the 
signaling literature, see for example Teoh and Hwang, 1991). Therefore, we used the 
lowest ranked institutions with all the required information (Ramapo College of New 
Jersey #731, Coppin State University #733, Chicago State University #736, Western 
Oregon University #737, Portland State University #738, Mount Mary College #774). All 
students in the experiment worked with the same 12 institutions but to eliminate the 
influence of image, name, and order, we renamed the institutions as ‘A institution’, ‘B 
institution’ etc. and created 24 different permutations. 
Each of the advertisements included 15 pieces of information (items). 8 of them – referred 
to as important ones – are strongly connected to academic quality (institution type – 
university or college; acceptance rate; average Scholastic Aptitude Test score; out-of-
state tuition; full-time drop-out rate; faculty-student ratio; 4-year graduation rate; number 
of prominent graduates such as U.S. presidents, vice-presidents, Nobel and Pulitzer prize 
winners and justices). 7 of them – named as unimportant ones – are no or loosely 
connected to academic quality (year of foundation, size of settlement, expenses on 
campus room and board, expenses on books and supplies, financial aid percent, total 
enrolled students, women to men ratio).  
In the experiment the 12 higher education advertisements were provided to the students 
in a form of 2 different booklets (‘X’ and ‘Y’ type booklets). Booklet X was used in the first 
phase of the experiment while booklet Y in the second phase. For both the top 6 and 
average 6 institutions booklet X contained 2 advertisements with all the 15 pieces of 
information being specific; 2 with no specific information at all; 1 with 8 specific important 
and 7 non-specific unimportant information; 1 with 8 specific unimportant and 7 non-
specific important information. In booklet Y every item for every institution was specific. 
In case of numerical advertisement items we used accurate data in the specific and much 
less accurate data in the non-specific cases. In case of the single item of institution type 
we used the term university or college in the specific and higher education institution in 
the non-specific version.  
In the first phase (consisting of 2 turns) of the experiment students were provided booklet 
X and first were asked to classify the 12 institutions as top or average ones. After this 
turn answers were collected and in the second turn (in the same phase) participants were 
asked to rank the same institutions according to a descending order of putative quality. 
At the end of this phase both the student rankings and the booklets X were collected. In 
the second phase students were given booklet Y and they had to classify and then also 
to rank the institutions again (coded names and the sequence of the institutions in the 
two booklets were independent from each other). 
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To ensure the interest of the participating students in the experiment they were offered 
some extra points to their semester grade: every student got 2 percentage points for the 
participation, the student with the best overall result (most realistic classifications and 





After reviewing the literature we can conclude that the top higher education institutions 
should publish a greater quantity of more specific information than their average 
counterparts. The reason behind this is the impact of the information on the competitive 
advantage. The transparency serves as a signal itself: customers know that more 
transparent institutions tend to be better in academic terms. 
To examine our hypotheses, paired sample t-tests were used. First we compared the 
students' evaluation of the institutions (classifying them as top or average quality 
institution and ranking them in descending quality order) in the first (based on the less 
specific booklet X) vs. in the second phase (based on the fully specific booklet Y). We 
found that the students classified the institutions more precisely (top as top, average as 
average), and gave them lower (better) ranks for the top and higher (worse) ranks for the 
average institutions more likely in the second phase (when they knew all of the 
information). The above mentioned results are all significant and confirm H1 and H2 
hypotheses: publishing more specific information about themselves provides higher 
quality institutions a competitive advantage as they are judged better when more specific 
information is present than when only less specific information is available, while the same 
situation provides a disadvantage for the average quality institutions as they are judged 
worse when more specific information is known than when only less specific information 
is available. 
Since the directions of the informational impact on top and average institutions are 
different, there is no significant effect on the total sample of institutions in case of 
classification. Statistical data are shown in Table 2. Difference in ranking of all of the 
institutions is trivially impossible, thus it was not analysed.  
 
Table 2: Comparing the results of both classification and order ranking assignments by 
the true quality of the institutions and the booklet type (N = 101) 
Test variable Booklet Mean Std. dev. t 
Number of top institutions 
classified correctly  
X 5.3762 1.1212 -4.4955*** 
Y 5.7822 0.7824 
Number of average 
institutions classified correctly  
X 0.8416 1.1201 5.4365*** 
Y 0.2673 0.8111 
Number of all the institutions 
classified correctly  
X 6.2178 1.2133 1.5306 
Y 6.0495 0.7399 
Average ranking of top 
institutions 
X 3.7277 0.5481 3.7034*** 
Y 3.5066 0.2272 
Average ranking of average 
institutions 
X 9.2723 0.5481 -3.6143*** 
Y 9.4785 0.1694 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation, t = value of the Student t statistic;  
*** = significant at level 0.01. 
 
If the advertisement of a top institution was totally specific, then the students have 
classified it as a top one significantly more likely than if it was not specific at all. An average 
institution tended to be (incorrectly) classified as a better one more likely if its 
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advertisement was not specific at all. In case of the top institutions the advertisements 
including only specific information got significantly lower (better) ranks on average than 
those with no specific information. Table 3 presents the statistical data.  
 
Table 3: Comparing the results of both classification and order ranking assignments by 
the true quality of the institutions in cases when all the items are specific and when no 
item is specific (N = 101) 
Test variable Specific items Mean Std. dev. t 
Likelihood of classifying top 
institutions as top 
All 0.9455 0.1988 3.0693*** 
 No 0.8465 0.3220 
Likelihood of classifying 
average institutions as top 
All 0.0891 0.2490 -2.5991** 
No 0.1931 0.3238 
Likelihood of classifying all 
institutions as top 
All 0.5173 0.1381 -0.0890 
 No 0.5198 0.2227 
Average ranking of top 
institutions 
All 2.8762 1.3104 -3.7905*** 
No 3.8614 1.6899 
Average ranking of average 
institutions 
All 9.5594 1.5170 1.2461 
 No 9.2178 1.5547 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation, t = value of the Student t statistic;  
*** = significant at level 0.01; ** = significant at level 0.05. 
 
The same analysis (Table 3) also showed that in case of the average quality institutions 
the mean of the rankings of the non-specific advertisements was somewhat better but the 
difference is not significant. These results confirm both hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Involving the not totally specific nor totally unspecific advertisements, too, we found if at 
least the important information was specific, then the top institutions were classified as 
top ones more likely than if only unimportant or no information was specific. In case of the 
average quality institutions the effect is the opposite. In the ranking assignment specificity 
of information improved the accuracy of the decisions only for the top institutions 
significantly, though the direction of the effect is the same as expected in case of the 
average quality institutions as well (more specified advertisement causes worse ranks). 
These results confirm hypothesis 3. Table 4 contains the statistics. 
 
Table 4: Comparing the results of both classification and order ranking assignments by 
the true quality of the institutions in cases when at least the important items are specific 
and when no or only the unimportant items are specific (N = 101) 
Test variable Specific items Mean Std. dev. t 
Likelihood of classifying top 
institutions as top 
Important or all 0.9356 0.1900 2.6906*** 
Unimportant or no 0.8614 0.2678 
Likelihood of classifying 
average institutions as top 
Important or all 0.0809 0.1909 -2.6007** 
Unimportant or no 0.1683 0.3005 
Likelihood of classifying all 
institutions as top 
Important or all 0.5083 0.1090 -0.2816 
Unimportant or no 0.5149 0.1887 
Average ranking of top 
institutions 
Important or all 3.2508 1.2879 -3.1784*** 
Unimportant or no 4.0957 1.6134 
Average ranking of average 
institutions 
Important or all 9.5429 1.3668 1.5477 
Unimportant or no 9.1452 1.4693 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation, t = value of the Student t statistic;  




Another paired t-test revealed if the unimportant information items were the only specific 
ones, the ranks of top institutions worsened significantly compared to the case if no items 
of information were specific (thus increasing the accuracy of unimportant items only had 
an adverse effect). This was the only significant effect comparing the cases where no vs. 
only the unimportant items were specific. These findings support the second part of H3. 
Table 5 presents the related data. 
In the following analysis we found if the unimportant pieces of information were the only 
specific ones, average quality institutions were evaluated as top ones significantly more 
frequently than when only important information was specific. In case of top institutions 
there was no such significant effect. In case of top institutions average rankings tended 
to be more correct if the important information items were the only specific ones than if 
the unimportant items were the only specific ones. Average quality institutions did not 
differ in rankings in this comparison. As specificity of important information enhances, 
while specificity of unimportant items worsen the decision making process, these results 
support our third hypothesis (H3). Table 6 shows the statistical data. 
 
Table 5: Comparing the results of both classification and order ranking assignments by 
the true quality of the institutions in cases when only the unimportant items are specific 
and when no item is specific (N = 101) 
Test variable Specific items Mean Std. dev. t 
Likelihood of classifying top 
institutions as top 
Unimportant only 0.8911 0.3131 1.2164 
 No 0.8465 0.3220 
Likelihood of classifying 
average institutions as top 
Unimportant only 0.2178 0.4148 0.6850 
No 0.1931 0.3238 
Likelihood of classifying all 
institutions as top 
Unimportant only 0.5545 0.2335 1.3279 
No 0.5198 0.2227 
Average ranking of top 
institutions 
Unimportant only 4.5644 2.2866 3.2602*** 
No 3.8614 1.6899 
Average ranking of average 
institutions 
Unimportant only 9.0000 2.5807 -0.7979 
No 9.2178 1.5547 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation, t = value of the Student t statistic;  
*** = significant at level 0.01 
 
Table 6: Comparing the results of both classification and order ranking assignments by 
the true quality of the institutions in cases when only the unimportant items are specific 
and when only the important items are specific (N = 101) 
Test variable Specific items Mean Std. dev. t 
Likelihood of classifying top 
institutions as top 
Unimportant 0.8911 0.3131 -0.8308 
Important 0.9208 0.2714 
Likelihood of classifying 
average institutions as top 
Unimportant 0.2178 0.4148 3.1103*** 
Important 0.0792 0.2714 
Likelihood of classifying all 
institutions as top 
Unimportant 0.5545 0.2335 1.8826* 
Important 0.5000 0.1581 
Average ranking of top 
institutions 
Unimportant 4.5644 2.2866 2.2973** 
Important 3.7723 1.9436 
Average ranking of average 
institutions 
Unimportant 9.0000 2.5807 -1.1602 
Important 9.4059 2.1456 
Note: Std. dev. = standard deviation, t = value of the Student t statistic;  






This paper aimed to reveal the relationship between the quality of information published 
by the higher education institutions and their customers’ evaluation on them. Our findings 
confirm our 3 hypotheses: Top institutions were classified as top ones more likely and 
were ranked lower (better) on average if more specific information were available than if 
less specific information was provided that means that more specific information gives 
them a competitive advantage (H1). In case of average quality institutions, however, less 
specific wordings lead more likely to being classified as top ones and lower (better) ranks 
on average that shows that more specific information means a competitive disadvantage 
for these types of institutions (H2). Given more important information being specific our 
results show that the students evaluate the institutions more precisely in case of both the 
top and the average quality institutions while their evaluation is less accurate if 
unimportant information is specific (H3). 
These results, however, may be influenced by some cultural traits, thus research may be 
expanded to students from other countries in the future. Another direction of the 
improvement of our research is to examine these effects in case of higher education 
institutions outside the U.S. Moreover, we can investigate whether the information 
providing behaviour of higher education institutions corresponds to our findings (i.e. top 
universities publish more specific while average or low-ranked universities publish no or 
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